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determination of the Board's "reasonable and rational intent" utilized
to interpret the statute, is plenary. Though Somers Town Code
provision 214-98 permitted farms on A-i zoned property, Hillside's use
was not included within provision 214-4's "agriculture," or "cultivation
of the land" definitions. The court distinguished spring water
collection because it does not require soil preparation "for the
purpose of seeding the. land or growing crops," and further, because
spring water cannot be planted, grown, or harvested, but only
collected, requiring no soil to "grow or nurture some living thing."
The court further rejected Hillside's contention that collecting
spring water qualified as an "agricultural" or "farming" use because it
entailed "harvesting any agricultural.., commodity," under General
Statutes § 1-1 (q). Unpersuaded, the court was bound by Somers Town
Code 214-4's express "agriculture" definition and could not defer to
this statutory definition.
Hillside further argued the legislature
amended General Statutes § 19a-341 to classify spring water collection
as an agricultural activity. However, the court maintained the statute
bore no relevance to "agriculture" in provision 214-4, or to applicable
zoning regulations. Rather, the statute simply states spring water
cannot be collected in a manner constituting a nuisance.
Furthermore, the court found unacceptable Hillside's contention that
the use was permitted because it took place on a farm, because it is not
an "accessory use" incident to a permitted agricultural use within 2144, but rather activity "having no relation to the farm itself."
However, the court deemed the Board failed to initially address
whether the activity was legally nonconforming. Thus, the trial court's
determination of such issue was improper, as the factual record is
insufficient for the appellate court to make its own determination.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to
remand this issue to the Board. Thejudgment was otherwise affirmed.
Robert Lykos
FLORIDA
Quiles v. Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397 (Fla.App. 2001) (holding the
city of Boynton Beach's decision to add fluoride to the city's potable
water supply did not violate a citizen's right to refuse medical
treatment under Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution).
The Boynton Beach City Commission voted to add fluoride to the
city's potable water supply. Jesus F. Quiles ("Quiles"), a citizen, filed a
suit against the City alleging the fluoridation measure violated his right
to refuse medical treatment under Article I, Section 23 of the Florida
Constitution. The circuit court granted the city of Boynton Beach's
("Boynton") motion to dismiss with prejudice. Quiles appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, which affirmed the circuit
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court, and held the fluoridation measure was a valid exercise of
Boynton's police power and was not an arbitrary or unreasonable
imposition on Quiles' constitutional rights.
The court examined the power vested in a municipality under the
Florida Constitution and found a municipality had broad
governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to perform
municipal functions and services. Furthermore, the court found a
public authority, in a municipality, must protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens. The court said this duty included
sanitary and health regulations for the municipality's waterworks, as
evidenced by a Florida case that specifically upheld adding fluoride to
the city water supply as a valid exercise of a municipality's police
power.
Quiles asserted that the fluoridation was not within Boynton's
police power because fluoride had no real health benefits and was not
necessary to fight disease or make the water potable, but was a
prophylactic measure to fight tooth decay. Thus, Quiles claimed he
was forced to consume fluoride through Boynton's water, which
amounted to compulsory medication in violation of his right to privacy
under Article 1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. The court
distinguished Boynton's fluoridation measure from the prohibited
compulsory medication cases because Boynton fluoridated the water
before it entered Quiles' household and never sought to introduce
fluoride directly into Quiles' bloodstream. Thus, the court held
Boynton's fluoridation measure was not prohibited compulsory
medication because Quiles was free to choose not to ingest Boynton's
fluoridated water.
Quiles also argued that Boynton's power was limited to protecting
citizen health and did not extend to improving health by preventing
certain conditions. The court realized Quiles made a valid distinction,
but dismissed this contention saying it was not the duty of the court to
judge the wisdom of a municipality when adopting health measures.
The court's role was only to determine if Boynton acted within their
legal and constitutional limitations. Thus, the court held Boynton's
decision to fluoridate their potable water supply was within the
municipality's police power.
Kirstin E. McMillan
IDAHO
N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Gisler (In re SRBA Case No. 39576,
Subcase No. 36-00077D), 40 P.3d 105 (Idaho 2002) (holding
objections to decrees must be raised at the objection and response
phase of an adjudication, not in a motion to alter or amend).
The North Snake Groundwater District ("District") brought this
appeal contesting the decree of a water right to Bradley and Linda

